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Visual sensor networks (VSNs) provide surveillance images/video which must be protected from eavesdropping and tampering en
route to the base station. In the spirit of sensor networks, we propose a novel paradigm for securing privacy and confidentiality
in a distributed manner. Our paradigm is based on the control of dynamical systems, which we show is well suited for VSNs due
to its low complexity in terms of processing and communication, while achieving robustness to both unintentional noise and
intentional attacks as long as a small subset of nodes are affected. We also present a low complexity algorithm called TANGRAM
to demonstrate the feasibility of applying our novel paradigm to VSNs. We present and discuss simulation results of TANGRAM.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Visual data is an integral part of the interface between hu-
mans and their environment. Visual data in the form of im-
ages and video can be used to enhance a human operator’s
ability to reliably make crucial decisions in the face of alerts
provided by sensing mechanisms. For example, in a com-
bat field, a sensor network can be deployed to sense temper-
ature, toxins, vibrations/movement, and so forth. To reliably
assess whether a change in the sensed phenomena is due
to enemy infiltration or natural environmental and fauna
causes, it is useful to obtain additional side information in
the form of an image. As another example, in health care
facilities [1, 2], one may measure a patient’s vital statistics,
such as heart rate, using sensors. When such measured statis-
tics indicate that the patient is in imminent danger, visual
side information may quickly determine whether the mea-
surements are valid or caused by misplaced or malfunction-
ing sensors. Following this motivation, acquisition of visual
data in sensor networks can be used to enhance the quality
of service in surveillance applications in which a human op-
erator interfaces at the sink of the network [3]. Such sensor
networks are called visual sensor networks (VSNs) or often
multimedia sensor networks [4]. The emergence of low-cost
portable off-the-shelf sensor devices has thrust forward the
development of VSN architectures, systems, and testbeds [1–
3, 5–12].
Acquisition and processing of visual data in sensor net-
works come at a cost. First, visual data in the form of images
or video require larger storage and transmission resources
than do traditional scalar data such as temperature or heart
rate. These resource requirements are further bloated when
every sensor is equipped to acquire and process images and
video. Furthermore, image processing requires more power
to process than conventional scalar data, and hence VSNs
may not meet the resource constraints placed upon tradi-
tional scalar-data-based sensor networks. This suggests that
visual data should be acquired and processed judiciously,
perhaps by one or two cameras within a confined area.
However as we consider in this paper, from the perspective
of resilience to physical and electronic attack, dense VSNs
demonstrate potential for security and surveillance applica-
tions.
Visual data may be intercepted by illicit parties for use
not originally intended. For example, in a military scenario,
interception of surveillance images can be used by an enemy
to learn and counter the efforts of a mission. In a health-care
scenario, interception of images by outsiders compromises
patient privacy rights. Therefore a means to protect these im-
ages needs to be built into VSNs. In order to combat physical
attacks, electronic means are often employed in addition to
more robust ad hoc networking architectures. For example,
the “one camera” architecture suggested above is vulnerable
to physical attacks such as unlawful interception, tampering,
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or capture of entities in the network. Instead of preventing
such actions, it is more feasible to engineer information secu-
rity mechanisms to deny illicit parties access to the semantic
content of visual data.
Traditionally, to deny third parties access to content, en-
cryption is employed [13]. However, recently it has been
noted that the use of these powerful cryptosystems on vi-
sual data further exacerbates processing power (resource)
requirements as mentioned above [14–16]. Measures have
been taken to trade off security with processing complexity,
and in this paper we follow this philosophy.
In the spirit of sensor networks, we opt for a densely dis-
tributed architecture in which every sensor is equipped with
a camera for visual acquisition, as well as some simple im-
age processing capabilities. It is not difficult to envision that
physical security based on a distributed infrastructure shares
all the same advantages as those in which sensor network re-
search pioneers were drawn to. The principle of redundancy
compensates for sensor failure either due to natural (i.e., bat-
tery failure, noise in the environment, or sensor hardware) or
malicious causes. From a physical security standpoint, distri-
bution offers safeguard against illicit capture of a few sensor
nodes and its cryptographic keys stored on-board [17, 18],
which we term node capture. Attackers are hence forced to
capture all nodes or intercept all relevant node communique
in order to access semantic information. In this paper, we
propose a general paradigm for distributing security in a vi-
sual sensor network.
1.1. Scope and contribution
We focus, in this paper, on presenting a novel distributed
approach to protect dense VSNs against eavesdropping at-
tacks. Other security issues including authentication, mes-
sage freshness and replay, key management, physical and ac-
tuation attacks, and common denial-of-service attacks are,
in part, considered by existing sensor network security liter-
ature and are beyond the scope of the paper.
In [19], security for the IP-based video surveillance prob-
lem is considered. In this paper we consider a distributed
security scheme for VSNs in which camera nodes work to-
gether. We consider a VSN, which we define to be a collection
of sensor nodes each having image acquisition and process-
ing capabilities. Within a VSN, a cluster of nodes is defined
to be a subset of N nodes that are recording or capturing the
same scene at approximately the same camera orientation. A
security goal of each node in a cluster is to send partial visual
information, which we call shares to a base station or multi-
ple base stations, such that
(1) the base station(s) can reconstruct (or decrypt) an ap-
proximation of the scene being recorded by the cluster
when t + 1 or more shares are available;
(2) interception of t or fewer shares will not reveal the
scene being recorded.
Secret sharing, popularized by Shamir [18], is the process
by which a trusted central authority called the dealer creates
and securely distributes N shares to N participants, such that
only certain subsets of participants can recover a secret key
K by amalgamating their shares. Our problem is similar to
secret sharing, except for the following differences:
(1) traditional secret sharing requires a trusted central au-
thority to create the shares and distribute them se-
curely; in our distributed VSN problem, a different
share is created by each node of a cluster (with some
minor coordination to guarantee robust recovery);
(2) we allow for t or fewer nodes to be captured, thus re-
vealing any secret keys;
(3) we allow for t or fewer shares to be corrupted or tam-
pered with.
We now point out other existing secret sharing works,
and show how our work differs. In visual secret sharing (VSS)
[20–23], the goal is similar; a dealer creates N transparencies
and securely distributes them toN participants. If a subset of
transparencies are overlaid upon one another, the secret im-
age is revealed—this is the decryption process. In most VSS
schemes, the decryption process (i.e., overlaying transparen-
cies) has lower complexity than either creating the shares or
transmitting/storing them. This is due to the fact that extra
information must be embedded into the transparencies in
order to support such trivial decryption. In sensor networks,
this is not favorable; instead the opposite role is favored, be-
ing that complexity is lower at the encrypting end (node
end), and higher at the decrypting end (base station end)
[24]. Of course VSS also suffers from the need for a trusted
central authority as does secret sharing. Next, we point out a
distributed encryption scheme that does not require a trusted
central authority based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem
[25, 26]. One draw-back of [25, 26] is that this public-key
cryptography scheme was not developed for sensor networks
(but rather for fault-tolerant distributed systems), hence the
complexity at the node end is much higher. In addition, the
method is not always immune to node capture, particularly
if the so-called source node is captured, key information can
be used to reveal the secret.
To this end, this paper offers a general paradigm for
creating shares in a VSN, and hence many algorithms can
be created based on the same principles. The use of dy-
namic system theory for this purpose is novel and, as
we demonstrate, provides the following attractive charac-
teristics: (a) dynamism and evolution to exploit the dis-
tributed and collaborative nature of VSNs for share gener-
ation, (b) robustness to compensate for sensor error and ma-
licious tampering, (c) obfuscation in order to provide im-
age/video scrambling with a more competitive compromise
between security and practicality for VSNs, and (d) flexibil-
ity and simplicity for lightweight implementation. The dy-
namic system approach allows the creative incorporation of
the many competing VSN objectives of robustness, secu-
rity and practicality into a framework with well-developed
mathematical background based on Lyapunov theory. This
has the advantage of producing a solution that is dis-
tributed and lower complexity and hence most appropri-
ate for VSNs in comparison to the existing methods sur-
veyed above. We analyze our proposed technique, called
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TANGRAM, to demonstrate its potential performance and
practicality.
Finally, we note that our paradigm is geared towards vi-
sual data, or any kind of data whose semantics are not de-
stroyed by small perturbations. The inherent redundant na-
ture of visual data offers both pros and cons. On the one
hand, visual redundancy offers resiliency against errors. On
the other hand, visual redundancy translates into higher
communication and storage costs. Hence a tradeoff between
robustness and compression is also considered in this paper.
This paper is separated into three parts. In Section 2, the
general paradigm is presented.Within this section we formu-
late the problem, introduce notations and definitions, and fi-
nally present the general architecture and guiding principles
used to design a solution. In Section 3, we present an algo-
rithm using our paradigm. In Section 4, we present simula-
tion results to verify visual security.
2. GENERAL PARADIGM
In this section we develop the general paradigm.1 First we
formally present the problem and assumptions. Next we de-
fine basic elements used in the framework, and finally we
present the paradigm.
2.1. Problem formulation
Suppose a collection of N sensor nodes equipped with im-
age acquisition and processing capabilities is deployed in
close physical proximity such that they all capture the same
scene. To quantify this statement, let {I0, I1, . . . , IN−1} repre-
sent the N grayscale images captured by the N nodes.2 Here
Ii, 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 are m × n matrices containing integer
values in the set {0, 1, . . . , 255}. Assume that these N im-
ages are noisy versions of a representative image Ir , such that
Ii = Ir +nr , where nr is a random matrix of integers based on
some distribution with zero-mean and small variance. This
assumption allows us to approximate the different sensor ac-
quisitions as the same image, that is, Ii ≈ Ir , which will sim-
plify the computations. We will justify this assumption soon
in the coming section.
We also assume that the VSN is capable of pairwise (be-
tween two neighboring nodes) and individual (between node
and base station) key distributions. In addition, each node is
capable of communications to neighboring nodes and to the
base station (possibly via multihop networking).
2.1.1. Goals of this paradigm
The goal is for each sensor node i to encrypt its image Ii, re-
sulting in the share ̂Ii, such that for some subset of shares
1 In this paper we generalize the paradigm previously developed in [27],
hence encompassing a broader class of algorithms.
2 Color images can be treated in the same manner by defining accompany-
ing color planes dependent on formats such as RGB, HSV, YCbCr, and so
forth.
S ⊆ {̂I0, ̂I1, . . . , ̂IN−1}, and subset of sensor nodes3 T ⊆ {0, 1,
. . . ,N − 1} corresponding to S
(1) if the cardinality of S is greater than t, that is, |S| > t,
then a visual approximation of Ir can be derived from
S;
(2) if |S| ≤ t, then a visual approximation of Ir cannot be
derived from S alone;
(3) if the sensor nodes of T with |T| ≤ t are physically
captured and removed from the network, any statically
stored information4 on these nodes along with the cor-
responding shares in S will not help the attacker in de-
riving a visual approximation of Ir ;
(4) key management in the form of rekeying or key up-
dates is not necessary to deal with the particular issues
addressed in this paper.
We will define the quantitative notion of visual approxima-
tion in the coming subsection. Also we note that although
existing secret sharing algorithms can be adjusted to satisfy
point 3 through rekeying or key updating, our paradigm
does not explicitly require keymanagement leading to amore
practical solution for distributed VSNs.
2.1.2. Assumptions
We now impose the following assumptions on the attacker.
(1) The attacker has limited ability to employ physical at-
tacks on the observation area. Specifically, the attacker
cannot deploy his own cameras to capture the same
scene as the VSN nodes nor can he physically attack
the observation area such as block the scene.5 In addi-
tion, the attacker can only physically capture and re-
move nodes from the network, but cannot wiretap a
node and eavesdrop on all activities on-board a sensor
node.
(2) The attacker can only intercept or tamper the shares of
a subset of nodes of cardinality ≤ t.
(3) The attacker is less likely to intercept communica-
tion between nodes without being detected due to the
nodes being in close proximity; the attacker is more
likely to intercept communication between nodes and
the base station(s). See Figure 1.
We impose the following assumptions on the sensor
nodes.
(1) The VSN is aware when a node is removed from the
network, and will stop communicating with the rogue
node.
(2) Every node can perform the duties of any other node.
Hence when a node dies, the nodes within a cluster
can reorganize their logistics. In addition, nodes are
3 In this paper, we denoteN nodes by giving them unique integer identifiers
starting with 0.
4 By statically stored, we mean keys, codebooks, and so forth. Any values
created from computation would not be statically stored.
5 Physical actuation attacks considered in, for example, [28] are beyond the
scope of this work.
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replenished so that an area of observation is never left
starved for nodes.
(3) We assume that the nodes are capable of reposition-
ing collectively (i.e., rotating panoramically) to cap-
ture different scenes in order to avoid the message re-
send attack [29].
2.2. Preliminaries
In this section we define the basic elements used in our
paradigm. First we define an image space by converting an
image matrix Ii into a (m · n) × 1 column vector xi, via a
column-wise raster scan as shown in (1).
Ii =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
x1,1 x1,2 · · · x1,n−1 x1,n
x2,1 x2,2 · · · x2,n−1 x2,n
...
...
. . .
...
...
xm−1,1 xm−1,2 · · · xm−1,n−1 xm−1,n
xm,1 xm,2 · · · xm,n−1 xm,n
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
,
xi =
(
x1,1 x2,1 · · · xm,1 x1,2 x2,2 · · · xm,2 · · · xm,n
)T
.
(1)
The collection of all (m·n)×1 column vectors constitutes
our image space, and each column vector is called a state.
We note that although we defined an image to take on inte-
ger values in the range 0 to 255, the image space includes all
(m·n)×1 column vectors with real elements. This collection
along with the usual operators is a vector space over the real
field.
Our notion of visual approximation is based on the norm
of a vector.6 The norm of a vector xi is the l2–norm de-
noted by ‖xi‖. To quantify visual similarity or dissimilarity
for practical use, two variables ρ0 ≤ ρ1 are chosen as a func-
tion of the (image) state xi in question, such that the annulus
centered about xi, as given in (2), completely defines the vi-
sual similarity and dissimilarity:
Axi =
{
x : ρ0 ≤
∥
∥x − xi
∥
∥ ≤ ρ1
}
. (2)
The complement of the annulus can be separated into two
regions: the region enclosed by the annulus is called the sim-
ilar region, where the states in here share the semantics of
xi; the region outside the annulus is called the dissimilar re-
gion, where the semantics of xi cannot be visually deduced
from states in here. The annulus itself defines a fuzzy re-
gion, which accounts for differences in individual perception.
Figure 2 illustrates the partitioning of the image space into
6 We note that although this notion does not model the human visual sys-
tem accurately, it is used often for reasons of simplicity in MPEG encod-
ing, for example block matching [30].
Common scene
Node
0
Node
1
Node
N   1
  
Cluster
Attack most likely en route to base station
Base station Base station Base station
Figure 1: Communication scheme, layout of a cluster, and the most
common point of attack.
Every state outside is
perceptually dissimilar to xi
Every state in this region is
perceptually similar to xi
“Fuzzy” region
xi
p1
p0
Figure 2: Separation of image space into perceptual similar, dissim-
ilar, and fuzzy regions.
similar, dissimilar, and fuzzy regions. It is clear that the vari-
ables ρ0 ≤ ρ1 depend on the human visual system, and hence
is application-dependent.
2.3. Architecture and principles
Suppose that every sensor node records the representa-
tive image Ir (i.e., the common scene), which corresponds
with the representative state x. The central idea behind our
paradigm is that we design a discrete-time dynamical system
such that each node has an access to only a certain part of
this dynamical system and not to its entirety. Identifiers 0 to
N −1 are assigned to each of the N nodes. A node with iden-
tifier k is then responsible for applying a control to move the
state at time k of the dynamical system closer to the desired
x. The node’s control is the node’s share. Since an attacker
who intercepts a subset of shares and/or physically captures
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Require: Initial state x0 loaded into node 0 and partial system fi for each node i;
all nodes capture common scene represented by x
Ensure: Shares ui, 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1
(1) for k = 0 to N − 1 do
(2) {Each iteration is performed by a different node, i.e., node k}
(3) if k = 0 then
(4) Receive ek−1,k from node k − 1
(5) xk ⇐ DKk−1,k
(
ek−1,k
) {Decrypt with pair-wise key shared with node k − 1}
(6) end if
(7) uk ⇐ gk(xk , x) {To be designed to drive states to x}
(8) if k = N − 1 then
(9) xk+1 ⇐ fk
(
xk ,uk
)
(10) ek,k+1 ⇐ EKk,k+1
(
xk+1
) {Encrypt with pair-wise key shared with k + 1}
(11) Destroy xk+1 {So if this node is captured, attacker does not have this}
(12) Send ek,k+1 to node k + 1
(13) end if
(14) if k = 0 then
(15) Destroy xk {So if this node is captured, attacker does not have this}
(16) end if
(17) Send uk to the base station {This is node k’s share}
(18) end for
Algorithm 1: Distributed encryption for VSN.
a subset of nodes only knows part of the dynamical system,7
the attacker cannot drive this partial dynamical system to the
secret x. In Section 2.4, we will discuss the motivation for us-
ing this paradigm.
From the dynamical systems literature, let Σp be a user-
designed plant that is described by a state equation (discrete-
time difference equation) as in (3):
Σp : xk+1 = fk
(
xk,uk,wk
)
. (3)
Here, the vectors denoted by xk are called states, the vectors
denoted by uk are external controls/inputs, and wk is a ran-
dom vector noise term. Every node agrees ahead of time on
a starting node, also called the source node [25], which con-
tains a randomly generated initial state x0 (i.e., independent
of Ir), either through preprogramming the node hardware,
or some key distribution protocol.
Next we ensure that every node is endowed with only part
of the plant or that there is a random component of which
only one node is aware. For example, if the system is time-
varying, each node is endowed with a unique set of the pa-
rameters corresponding to each time instance. To be more
precise, let the nodes be numbered 0 to N − 1. Then node i
is endowed with fi, and for node i = j, fi = f j ; that is each
node only knows part of the system. Finally each node runs
an optimization algorithm whose goal is to drive any given
state to x. The pseudocode is presented in the table entitled
7 This does not violate Kerckhoff ’s principle [13], which states that the se-
curity of a system should only reside in the key, while the system can be
known. In practice, we can publish the system to be used, but keep secret
the system parameters, which can be regarded as keys.
Algorithm 1. Here we define ei, j to be the encrypted state,
which is created by node i and sent to node j.
In Algorithm 1, each iteration of the loop reflects the ac-
tivity of one particular node, namely the node associated
with the loop index k. We see that the source node 0 starts
off the algorithm by applying a function g0 (line 7—to be
designed) on the initial state x0 and the representative state
x—this is the external input or the so-called control to the
plant Σp. This control is then applied to the plant (line 9),
and the result is encrypted using a pair-wise key shared with
node 1 (line 10), and sent to node 1 (line 12). Continuing
with the remaining iterations of the loop, each node here-
after receives an encrypted state (line 4) from the previous
node, which is able to decrypt with its pair-wise key shared
with the previous node (line 5). The node then uses this state
to derive a new control (line 7), which drives the states closer
to the desired representative state x. The new state generated
by this control (line 9) is then encrypted with the pair-wise
key shared with the next node (line 10) and sent to the next
node (line 12). The controls generated by each node consti-
tute the set of shares, which are sent to the base station(s).
An overview of the communication scheme is depicted in
Figure 1. From an overall system perspective, the nodes can
be considered to cooperate to drive an initial state to the de-
sired representative state x by applying a control (which is the
node’s share) to the system via the state created by a previous
node, and then relaying the updated state to the next node.
Since the controls drive the plant to x, the decryption al-
gorithm is straight-forward as shown in Algorithm 2.
In order to decrypt, all the controls (or shares) and the
entire plant/system must be known. Hence an attacker is
forced to intercept all shares, or capture all nodes. Figure 3(a)
illustrates how the initial state is driven to the desired rep-
resentative state x. When a control is applied to a state, the
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Require: All shares ui, 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 received by base station(s),
and base station(s) have all fi, 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 and x0
Ensure: xN = x
(1) {Loop performed by a central unit at the base station}
(2) for k = 0 to N − 1 do
(3) xk+1 ⇐ fk
(
xk ,uk
)
(4) end for
Algorithm 2: Decryption at base station(s) for VSN.
dynamical system is moved to a new state. Controls are ap-
plied successively to the dynamical system to drive the state
to x and hence reconstruct the representative image Ir .
Finally, each iteration in Algorithm 1 can be thought of as
a round which adds confusion, hence Algorithm 1 mimics an
iterated block cipher [31] with each round being performed
by a single different node using a different key.
2.4. Motivation for this paradigm
There are many reasons why a dynamical systems approach
is chosen for this problem. Such theory is well developed to
handle external disturbances. For our problem, this is use-
ful to ensure that image decryption is robust to natural (un-
intentional) system disturbances such as hardware noise, or
intentional tampering. If we assume that the disturbance wi
is additive and constrained, for example bounded such that
‖wi‖ < C, then control laws can be designed such that the
trajectory stays within some region around the desired rep-
resentative state x as illustrated in Figure 3(b). If the ball
around x has radius ρ0 or less, where ρ0 is the variable ac-
counting for perceptual similarity from Section 2.2, then de-
cryption will still result in a good visual approximation of the
desired image.
2.5. Extensions
This robustness allows for some additional advantages. The
number of pair-wise keys that each sensor node carries to run
the proposed algorithm is always 2 (i.e., O(1)) regardless of
the number of nodes in a cluster. This is because node k only
needs to receive the previous state from node k− 1 and must
send its current state to node k + 1 requiring communica-
tion only among these nodes. This is a memory advantage
because, in contrast to the sharing scheme presented in [25],
the number of key fragments per node is O(
√
N), where N is
the number of nodes. Finally, if each node is regarded as a
vertex, and the communication between nodes is a directed
edge, then the VSN is a directed graph. The number of fan-
outs, or outdegree of each node in our scheme is exactly 2
(one for transmitting to the next node, and one for trans-
mitting to the base station(s)) regardless of the number of
nodes in the cluster (i.e., O(1)). However, the outdegree per
node in [25] is again O(
√
N). Also, the unidirectional nature
of the internode communication in our paradigm promotes
an optical sensor network architecture [32], which has been
shown to be energy-efficient for communicating multimedia
through free space [33].
3. TANGRAM: ALGORITHM USING RANDOMNESS
In this section we present an algorithm based on random-
ness (i.e., random vectors and random variables) and Lya-
punov synthesis, which we call TANGRAM.8 In contrast to
the algorithm presented by the authors in [27], the algorithm
presented here is simpler lending itself more appropriately
to distributed VSN security. Lyapunov synthesis provides a
framework for generating the shares that drive an initial state
to a desired state for nonlinear dynamical systems in general.
We first review Lyapunov stability theory. The equilibria
of a discrete-time state space system in (3) are any solutions
xeq to (4):
xeq = fk
(
xeq,uk
)
. (4)
The goal is to design uk , such that starting from any ini-
tial state x0, the system converges to the unique equilibrium
xeq  x; when this is satisfied, x is said to be globally asymp-
totically stable. A popular way to achieve this goal is via Lya-
punov’s stability theorem [34].
Theorem 3.1 (global asymptotic stability). The equilibrium
xeq is globally asymptotically stable if there exists a function V :
Rm·n → R such that
(1) V(xeq) = 0;
(2) there are continuous, strictly increasing functions α :
R→ R and β : R→ R, where α(0) = β(0) = 0, and
α
(∥
∥x − xeq
∥
∥
) ≤ V(x) ≤ β(∥∥x − xeq
∥
∥
)
(5)
for all x ∈ Rm·n;
(3) V(x)→∞ as ‖x‖ → ∞;
(4) V(xk+1)−V(xk) < 0 for all k ≥ 0.
In Lyapunov synthesis, one begins by choosing the
Lyapunov function V that satisfies criteria 2 and 3 in
Theorem 3.1. The goal is then to design uk so that the equi-
librium xeq is forced to be the desired x, which satisfies crite-
rion 1, and the overall system with the control incorporated
satisfies criterion 4.
In [27] a linear system was proposed by the authors
where the system matrix Ak presented additional challenges
as they had to be stored on-board the sensor nodes. Here we
propose the following straightforward linear system given by
(6):
xk+1 = xk + uk. (6)
Although there are many ways to design uk = gk(xk, x), such
that (6) is globally asymptotically stable with respect to the
desired equilibrium x, our goal is that of secrecy/security,
and hence it seems natural and practical to use a random ap-
proach.
Because we cannot expect to achieve global asymptotic
stability in a purely random approach, we give Definition 3.2
to quantify the systems behavior at a particular time instance.
8 The word “tangram” means a puzzle.
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x
xN 1
x2
x1
x0
u0
u1
u2
uN 2
uN 1
Controls/shares
(red)
States
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...
(a)
x
xN 1
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x1
x0
u0
u1 + w1
u2
uN 2
uN 1
...
(b)
Figure 3: (a) Initial state being driven to the desired representative state x by node controls; (b) noisy control/share causes offset in trajectory
which stays within some ball.
Definition 3.2. We say a plant Σp with equilibrium xeq is be-
having globally asymptotically stable at time j if criteria 1 to 3
are satisfied in Theorem 3.1, and V(xk+1)−V(xk) < 0 for all
k ≤ j.
Remarks 3.3. Definition 3.2 tells us that a system looks like
a “promising” candidate for global asymptotic stability at a
particular time instance. We now propose a random control
law in Theorem 3.4 and state its property.
Theorem 3.4. Let Σp be the plant whose state space equation
is given by (6). Let
uk = − sgn
(
xk − x
) R+k , (7)
where denotes element-wise multiplication, sgn is the signum
function operating on each element of the vector
sgn(y) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
1 if y > 0,
0 if y = 0,
−1 if y < 0,
(8)
and R+k is a random vector taking on only nonnegative values
and whose mean vector E[R+k ] <  · 2|xk − x| for  > 0, where
“<” is taken element-by-element. Then Σp has equilibrium x,
and is behaving globally asymptotically stable at iteration k (or
node k, keeping in mind starting at 0) with probability greater
than (1− )k+1.
Remarks 3.5. The theorem provides a lower bound to the
probability that the system is behaving globally asymptoti-
cally stable at a given time. The simulation results will show
that this lower bound is quite loose, meaning that decryption
will result in images that fall in the similar region with much
higher probability than this lower bound.
Proof. Without loss of generality,9 let us take the scalar case,
in which we have
xk+1 = xk − sgn
(
xk − x
)
R+k . (9)
First we can verify that x is indeed the equilibrium by substi-
tuting x into xk on the right-hand side. Next, let us define
V(x) = (x − x)2 (10)
which indeed satisfies criteria 1 to 3 of Theorem 3.1. Starting
at k = 0, we see that
V
(
x1
)−V(x0
) = V(x0 − sgn
(
x0 − x
)
R+0
)−V(x0
)
= (x0 − sgn
(
x0 − x
)
R+0 − x
)2 − (x0 − x
)2
< 0
(11)
if x0−sgn(x0−x)R+0 is closer to x than x0 is; denote this event
for k = 0 as E0. Then the probability of the complement is
P(E0) = Pr{R+0 ≥ 2|x0 − x|}, which we can bound using
Markov’s inequality
Pr
{
R+0 ≥ 2
∣
∣x0 − x
∣
∣
} ≤ E
[
R+0
]
2
∣
∣x0 − x
∣
∣
< , (12)
where the last inequality is due to E[R+k ] <  · 2|xk − x|.
Therefore P(E0) > 1 − . Suppose that for some iteration
k− 1, P(E0∩E1∩· · ·∩Ek−1) > (1− )k. Then we can show
that P(Ek) > (1−) the same way we showed for P(E0). Since
the R+k ’s are independent for all k, P(E0 ∩ E1 ∩ · · · ∩ Ek) >
(1− )k+1, proving the theorem by induction.
9 TANGRAM operates pixel-by-pixel (or element-by-element), that is, only
confusion is introduced, hence we can restrict our analysis to a single
pixel/element.
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Remarks 3.6. To see why P(E0) = Pr{R+0 ≥ 2|x0 − x|}, we
define two cases: x0 < x, and x0 > x. Noting that R+k is always
nonnegative (the superscript + denotes this fact), if x0 < x,
then − sgn(x0 − x) = 1, hence − sgn(x0 − x)R+0 is positive;
when this quantity is added to x0, x0 is increasing positively
towards x in the correct direction. The event E0 occurs when
this quantity added is two times the distance that x0 is from x,
that is, 2|x0 − x|. The other case follows the same argument.
3.1. Security analysis
Next we analyze the security of this scheme. We begin with
the notion of perfect secrecy. Given plaintext and ciphertext
random variables P andC, respectively, a cipher provides per-
fect secrecy if I(P;C) = 0, where I(·; ·) denotes mutual infor-
mation. Ciphers that incorporate a great deal of randomness,
such as the one-time pad are good candidates for perfect se-
crecy. To show that TANGRAM satisfies perfect secrecy un-
der certain conditions, we present Lemma 3.7, which is based
on TANGRAM parameters. Then we discuss how Lemma 3.7
is related to TANGRAM.
Lemma 3.7. Let U = σ · R+ where R+ is a positive continuous
random variable whose mean is E[U] = θ = |θ1 − θ2|, where
θ1, θ2 are positive continuous random variables, σ = sgn(θ1 −
θ2). If h(θ) = h(θ1), then I(U ; θ2) = 0.
Proof. First we write h(U , θ | θ2, σ) in two ways using the
chain rule
h
(
U , θ | θ2, σ
) = h(U | θ2, σ
)
+ h
(
θ | U , θ2, σ
)
= h(θ | θ2, σ
)
+ h
(
U | θ, θ2, σ
)
.
(13)
Next we can simplify all the quantities. Throughout we use
the fact that θ can be written as θ = |θ1−θ2| = sgn(θ1−θ2)·
(θ1 − θ2) = σ · (θ1 − θ2):
h
(
U | θ2, σ
) = h(σ · R+ | θ2, σ
) = h(R+ | θ2
)
, (14)
h
(
θ | U , θ2, σ
) = h(σ · (θ1 − θ2
) | σ · R+, θ2, σ
)
= h(θ1 | R+
) = h(θ | R+),
(15)
h
(
θ | θ2, σ
) = h(σ · (θ1 − θ2
) | θ2, σ
)
= h(θ1
) = h(θ),
h
(
U | θ, θ2, σ
) = h(σ · R+ | θ, θ2, σ
)
= h(σ · R+ | θ, σ) = h(R+ | θ).
(16)
We have used the fact that h(θ) = h(θ1) in the last equalities
of (15). For the second equality in (16), we used the fact that
θ is the true mean of R+, hence θ2 provides no additional
information since θ = |θ1 − θ2|. Now substituting (14)–(16)
into (13), we get
h
(
R+ | θ2
)
+ h
(
θ | R+) = h(θ) + h(R+ | θ),
h
(
R+ | θ2
) = h(θ,R+)− h(θ | R+)
= h(R+).
(17)
Therefore I(R+; θ2) = h(R+)− h(R+|θ2) = 0.
Let us apply Lemma 3.7 to TANGRAM on a pixel-by-
pixel or element-by-element basis. We only assume that the
attacker has intercepted one share ui for some i, and that none
of the states xk nor the mean are known. Let θ1 = xi and
θ2 = x, and also multiply the mean by 2. If the entropy of xi
is equal to the entropy of the mean, then perfect secrecy of a
single pixel is achieved.
We note that the attacker does not have access to the
mean, and we can further enhance the security by loading
each sensor node with different probability density func-
tions (PDFs) for generating R+k and not revealing them; the
PDFs are a parameter of the algorithm, which can be consid-
ered a node-dependent key. If the aforementioned entropies
are not equal, we give a more general but weaker result in
Lemma 3.8.
Lemma 3.8. Let U = σ · R+ where R+ is a positive continuous
random variable whose mean is E[U] = θ = |θ1 − θ2|, where
θ1, θ2 are positive continuous random variables, σ = sgn(θ1 −
θ2). Then
I
(
θ2;U
) = h(U | θ1
)− h(U | θ). (18)
Proof. This time we write h(U , θ | θ1, σ) in two ways using
the chain rule
h
(
U , θ | θ1, σ
) = h(U | θ1, σ
)
+ h
(
θ | U , θ1, σ
)
= h(θ | θ1, σ
)
+ h
(
U | θ, θ1, σ
)
,
h
(
U | θ1, σ
) = h(σ · R+ | θ1, σ
) = h(R+ | θ1
)
,
h
(
θ | U , θ1, σ
) = h(σ · (θ1 − θ2
) | σ · R+, θ1, σ
)
= h(θ2 | R+
)
,
h
(
θ | θ1, σ
) = h(σ · (θ1 − θ2
) | θ1, σ
) = h(θ2
)
,
h
(
U | θ, θ1, σ
) = h(σ · R+ | θ, θ1, σ
)
= h(σ · R+ | θ, σ) = h(R+ | θ).
(19)
Combining the constituents
h
(
R+ | θ1
)
+ h
(
θ2 | R+
) = h(θ2
)
+ h
(
R+ | θ),
h
(
R+ | θ1
)− h(R+ | θ) = h(θ2
)− h(θ2 | R+
)
= I(θ2;R+
)
.
(20)
Having provided analysis for the simplest case of a single
interception, we give an analogy of taking a number τ and
randomly breaking it into N numbers τ0, τ1, . . . , τN−1 such
that the sum of these N numbers is equal to τ. If we give
one or two of these τi to someone and ask them to guess the
original number τ, it would be as difficult as deducing an
entire puzzle from one or two pieces alone.10
10 We note that our analogy partitions an image spatially, whereas in TAN-
GRAM, partitioning is performed at the pixel level. This is because spatial
partitionsmay still reveal some semantic content of the image in question.
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Require: Initial state x0 loaded into node 0, , σ2
Ensure: Shares ui, 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1
(1) for k = 0 to N − 1 do
(2) {Each iteration is performed by a different node, i.e., node k}
(3) if k = 0 then
(4) Receive ek−1,k from node k − 1
(5) xk ⇐ DKk−1,k
(
ek−1,k
) {Decrypt with pair-wise key shared with node k − 1}
(6) end if
(7) μ⇐ 2∣∣xk − x
∣
∣
(8) uk ⇐ − sgn
(
xk − x
) rand-positive(μ, σ2)
(9) if k = N − 1 then
(10) xk+1 ⇐ xk + uk
(11) ek,k+1 ⇐ EKk,k+1
(
xk+1
) {Encrypt with pair-wise key shared with k + 1}
(12) Destroy xk+1 {So if this node is captured, attacker does not have this}
(13) Send ek,k+1 to node k + 1
(14) end if
(15) if k = 0 then
(16) Destroy xk {So if this node is captured, attacker does not have this}
(17) end if
(18) Send uk to the base station {This is node k’s share}
(19) end for
Algorithm 3: TANGRAM.
Let us consider the scalar case again. For the case of more
than one interception, assume that t shares (where this t is
from the goals in Section 2.1) are intercepted. Then we want
to ensure that decryption using these t nodes falls in the
dissimilar region with high probability. Since the shares are
generated randomly, suppose that the first t shares are inter-
cepted. Then this t should satisfy (21) for δ > 0:
Pr
{∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
x − x0 −
t−1
∑
k=0
uk
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
> ρ1
}
> 1− δ. (21)
As we will see in Section 3.3, this criterion is coupled with ro-
bustness constraints, which renders the closed-form deriva-
tion of t intractable. Hence the determination of t will be left
to the devices of simulation found in Section 4.3.
3.2. Implementation
The particulars of the TANGRAMalgorithm are summarized
in Algorithm 3 for ease of reference. We now examine the
implementation of the TANGRAM algorithm and show that
it is indeed cost efficient, robust, and suited for VSNs.
How efficient is Algorithm 3 in terms of share size? This
question is inherently linked to the issue of compression. If
we look at this question at the pixel level, then the cost of
one pixel is its absolute value; hence the cost of all shares is
|u0| + |u1| + · · · + |uN−1|. Intuitively, a pixel with smaller
absolute value will require fewer bits to encode than a pixel
with larger absolute value, and hence from this point of view,
minimizing this cost achieves a crude form of compression.
Definition 3.9 (Optimal share size). The shares u0,u1, . . . ,
uN−1 generated by Algorithm 3 achieve optimal share size if
∣
∣u0
∣
∣ +
∣
∣u1
∣
∣ + · · · + ∣∣uN−1
∣
∣ ≤ ∣∣x − x0
∣
∣, (22)
where | · | is the element-wise absolute value.
Definition 3.9 is motivated by the fact that if the shares
overshoot the desired representative image, and oscillate
about the representative image, then they will effectively have
total absolute size greater than if the shares never overshoot.
Theorem 3.4 and its proof provides us with a result on opti-
mal share size as stated in Corollary 3.10.
Corollary 3.10. The shares produced by Algorithm 3 achieve
optimal share size with probability greater than
(1− 2)N . (23)
Remarks 3.11. The factor 2 comes from the fact that in order
to achieve optimal share size, we require R+k < |xk − x| for all
k; see the proof for Theorem 3.4.
3.3. Robustness
In this section we assume that noise (either through unin-
tentional sensor errors, miscalibrations, or intentional tam-
pering) is added to the shares. If we use Algorithm 3, we can
write decryption as x0 +
∑N−1
k=0 (uk + wk) = (x0 +
∑N−1
k=0 uk) +
∑N−1
k=0 wk = x +
∑N−1
k=0 wk, where we have also assumed that
imperfect decryption (i.e., all the shares and the initial state
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do not add up to be the representative state) is incorporated
into the noise vectors wk. From Section 2.2, if ‖
∑N−1
k=0 wk‖ <
ρ0 for the perceptual similarity constant ρ0, then decryp-
tion will still reveal the semantics of x. This constraint may
be unreasonable under an intentional attack situation, how-
ever our assumptions in Section 2.1.2 restrict the number of
shares attacked to no more than t, thus restricting the effect
on the decrypted image.
We exercise this assumption and assume the worst case
scenario, in which none of the t tampered shares may be
used. Let S be the set of shares of cardinality t that are ru-
ined. Then it is natural to use the complement S, resulting in
x0 +
∑N−1
k=0 IS(uk)uk, where
IA(x) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if x ∈ A,
0 if x /∈ A
(24)
is the indicator function. If ‖x− (x0 +
∑N−1
k=0 IS(uk)uk)‖ < ρ0,
then decryption will reveal the semantics as desired. There
are two questions that need to be answered. First, what is the
maximum t = |S| for which a perceptually acceptable recon-
struction is possible? Second, how does the base station(s)
determine the set S?
To address the first question, let us consider the scalar
case. Without loss of generality, assume the last t shares are
ruined while the firstN−t shares are pristine. Since the shares
are generated randomly, given a δ > 0, maximize t such that
Pr
{∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
x − x0 −
N−t−1
∑
k=0
uk
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
< ρ0
}
> 1− δ. (25)
This constraint probability can be written as
Pr
{
− ρ0 < x − x0 −
N−t−1
∑
k=0
uk < ρ0
}
= Pr
{
x − x0 − ρ0 <
N−t−1
∑
k=0
uk < x − x0 + ρ0
}
.
(26)
If we let Y = U1 +U2 + · · · ,UN−t−1 be the random variable
accounting for the sum of the random shares, and fY (y) its
PDF, then the problem for the scalar case is to maximize t
such that
∫ x−x0+ρ0
x−x0−ρ0
fY (y)dy > 1− δ. (27)
Even for the scalar case, this problem is formidable, since
the PDFs of the random variables Ui have unknown variable
means, and hence is best suited for computational simula-
tions.11
11 In addition to the constraint given by (27), (21) should also be satisfied
for security reasons. But obviously this makes the problem even more dif-
ficult.
The second problem can be rephrased as finding the set S
such that x0 +
∑N−1
k=0 IS(uk)uk is closest to x. Without any side
information, this problem is nontrivial. In fact, this problem
in general (without side information) is just as hard as the
knapsack problem known to be NP-complete [35]. To make
this problem tractable, the usual device is to embed an au-
thentication code (side information), such that the base sta-
tion(s) can verify whether each share is pristine or corrupted.
In this way, the base station(s) can construct the desired set
S.
4. SIMULATION AND INTERPRETATION
In this section we present the simulation results and dis-
cuss their meaning. We present results from two images. The
first image used is shown in Figure 4 and has dimensional-
ity of 587 × 393 while the second image has dimensionality
of 512 × 512 and can be seen in Figure 12. The significance
of choosing different image dimensions in our work is to
demonstrate that although the perceptual constants are typ-
ically determined empirically for each image, they may also
be reused for images of approximately the same dimensions.
This property is desirable for sensor networks which are of-
ten required to operate as autonomously as possible without
having to readjust its parameters.
4.1. Choosing ρ0 and ρ1
As one of the first steps in our implementation, we must
estimate values of the similarity and dissimilarity constants
ρ0 and ρ1 respectively as discussed in Section 2.2. By adding
zero-mean white Gaussian noise with different variances,
and visually inspecting the outcomes, we find that with a
variance of no more than 50, the image is still understand-
able, while with a variance of at least 500, the image is in-
comprehensible. To determine the norm, we ran several ex-
periments with variances 50 and 500, and computed the av-
erage norm of the noise, which turns out to be ρ0 = 24000
and ρ1 = 37000, respectively.
4.2. Random distribution
TANGRAM is based on a positive continuous distribution. In
our simulations, we use the lognormal distribution, since the
mean and variance can be controlled independently.12 The
lognormal PDF is given in (28), and its mean μ and variance
σ2 are given in (29), respectively:
f (x) = 1
s
√
2π
1
x
e−(ln(x)−m)
2/2s2 , (28)
μ = em+s2/2,
σ2 = e2(m+s2) − e2m+s2 .
(29)
12 Other one-sided continuous distributions such as exponential, chi-
squared have PDFs based on one parameter which controls both themean
and variance in tandem.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: (a) Original bus (© come.to/torontobus); (b) bus with AWGN σ2 = 50; (c) bus with AWGN σ2 = 500.
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Figure 5: (a) Similarity rate; (b) dissimilarity rate.
The mean is dependent on the parameter  (see Algorithm
3). In our simulations we use two values  = 10−2 and 10−3.
The variance can be defined by the user. In our simulations,
we use two values for the variance, σ2 = 5 and 15. We will
discuss the implications of  and σ2 in Section 4.5.
4.3. Determining suitableN and t
Next we want to determine how many sensor nodes are
needed so that decryption is satisfactory. Figure 5(a) shows
the rate (or simulated probability) that decryption will result
in an image that falls in the similar region characterized by ρ0.
We see that at least 40 shares are necessary before a decrypted
image falls in the similar region with high probability.
The value of t, that is, the total number of intercep-
tions allowed, can be stated as the number of shares an at-
tacker can intercept before decryption (using this number of
shares) results in an image that no longer falls in the dissim-
ilar region (i.e., it either falls in the fuzzy or similar region).
Figure 5(b) shows the rate (or simulated probability) that de-
cryption will result in an image that falls in the dissimilar re-
gion. We see that 20 shares or less will result in an image that
falls in the dissimilar region with high probability. Since the
determination of ρ1 was empirical, we choose a conservative
t, which is half of 20, giving t = 10.
Since we require at least 40 nodes for decryption, but al-
low 10 nodes to be intercepted, we choose N = 40 + 10 = 50
as the number of nodes in a cluster. Figure 6 shows an ex-
ample of a share, decryption using 10 shares, and decryption
using 40 shares. Images have been scaled appropriately for
highest perceptual quality.
4.4. Convergence and security
In Section 4.3 we presented the simulated probability of de-
cryption falling in the similar and dissimilar regions depend-
ing on the number of shares. An important question to ask
is the following: how does decryption transition between the
similar, fuzzy, and dismilar regions as the number of shares
available is varied? This question not only addresses conver-
gence, but also security from the point of view that if an at-
tacker is able to intercept one extra share, how does this ad-
ditional interception improve his ability to comprehend the
decrypted image.
12 EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6: (a) Sample share; (b) decryption using t = 10 shares; (c) decryption using 40 shares.
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Figure 7: (a) ‖x0+
∑n
k=0 uk−x‖ as a function of the number of shares n; (b) Pr{
∑n
k=0 |uk|≤|x−x0|} as a function of the number of shares n.
Figure 7(a) shows the average and minimum distances
between the decrypted image and the representative image.
We see that with more shares, the distance becomes closer,
that is, decryption results in a better visual approximation of
the representative image. Furthermore, we see that this phe-
nomenon happens linearly. From a security point of view,
each share intercepted linearly improves the attackers abil-
ity to comprehend the secret image. However, as long as the
number of shares intercepted by an attacker does not exceed
t, decryption will fall in the dissimilar region. In terms of
robustness, each share that is lost or damaged will degrade
the decrypted image linearly. Again if no more than t shares
are lost or damaged, decryption will not suffer provided that
these t shares are not used in decryption when they are dam-
aged.
Finally, Figure 7(b) shows the probability that the pixels
in a collection of shares have optimal share size as defined
in Definition 3.9. We see that the lower bound provided by
Corollary 3.10 is rather modest, and in fact pixels are likely
to achieve optimal share size with high probability.
4.5. Effect of  and σ2
In the plots above, we have shown the results for varying 
and σ2. From Algorithm 3, we know that the mean of the
distribution is a function of . The smaller we make , the
smaller the mean is. From Figure 7(a), we see that when
 = 10−3, the decrypted image is far from the representa-
tive image. Since this  = 10−3 is smaller than  = 10−2, the
mean is smaller, and hence each share size is smaller, and it
takes many more shares to result in a good visual approxima-
tion.
Similarly, when the variance is increased, we see that the
simulation with the larger σ2 = 15 also converges slower
than σ2 = 5. This is demonstrated in Figure 5(a), which
shows that slightly more shares are required for decryption
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 8: (a) Unintentional tampering: decrypted result of unreg-
istered shares; (b) intentional tampering: Lena masked; (c) decryp-
tion using 40 shares resists tampering and discloses Lena’s face.
to land in the similar region for the σ2 = 15 case. Of course
at the same time, we can allow attackers to intercept more
shares before leaving the dissimilar region when σ2 is larger
as shown in Figure 5(b).
4.6. Tampering
In this section we briefly examine the effects of unintentional
and intentional tampering. Figure 8(a) is the visually accept-
able result of combining 40 shares that are not registered;
that is, the 40 nodes each have different representative im-
ages that are random rotations of one another over a uni-
form distribution of −2.5 degrees to 2.5 degrees. Such mis-
alignments may be caused by misaligned cameras for exam-
ple, and hence we classify them as unintentional tampering.
Figure 8(b) shows Lena’s face being intentionally masked by
a mandrill’s face. Five nodes were given this tampered repre-
sentative image, and the result of decrypting with 40 shares
(a)
(b)
Figure 9: (a) 2-level Haar wavelet decomposition; (b) a share cre-
ated from the Haar wavelet domain.
is shown in Figure 8(c). Intuitively, since the majority of the
shares are unaffected, this majority visually overwhelms the
tampered minority. However this resilience against tamper-
ing comes at the cost of redundancy in the network, as a
large majority is needed. This agrees with Sections 4.3 and
4.4 in that N is always much larger than t, implying only a
small number of shares can be compromised compared to
the total number of shares in the network, thus completing
our insight into the tradeoff between resilience and redun-
dancy.
Up to this point, we have considered sharing the pix-
els of an image. Image compression usually takes place in
a domain other than the pixel domain, that is, a frequency
domain [30]. In this section we use a 2-level Haar wavelet
decomposition, which can be seen in Figure 9(a). In addi-
tion, we exercise rudimentary compression by discarding the
diagonal high frequency subbands in both levels (i.e., the
lower right corners of both levels in Figure 9(a)) to demon-
strate the feasibility of extending TANGRAM to incorporate
more standard compression techniques. Each node first ap-
plies a 2-level Haar wavelet decomposition to its represen-
tative image, and then TANGRAM proceeds exactly as out-
lined in Algorithm 3 on the wavelet subbands with the ex-
ception that the diagonal high frequency subbands in both
levels are discarded. At the base station(s), the discarded sub-
bands are replaced by zeros, and then Algorithm 2 is applied
on all subbands. Finally the inverse wavelet transform is per-
formed, resulting in a good visual approximation as shown
14 EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
(a)
(b)
Figure 10: (a) Decryption of Haar wavelet compressed shares;
(b) decryption of unregistered Haar wavelet compressed shares.
in Figure 10(a). We will refer to this extension as wavelet-
TANGRAM.
Next we compare wavelet-TANGRAM to TANGRAM for
a few special attacks to demonstrate the feasibility of ex-
tending TANGRAM. If an attacker arbitrarily intercepts one
wavelet-TANGRAM share and performs the appropriate in-
verse wavelet transform, then the resulting image is unintel-
ligible as shown in Figure 9(b); this is expected and anal-
ogous to Figure 6(a). If the representative images are mis-
aligned as described in Section 4.6, decryption with 40 shares
will still result in a good visual approximation as shown in
Figure 10(b).
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a paradigm for distributing privacy and
confidentiality in a visual sensor network. We have presented
a simple algorithm, TANGRAM, which meets low complex-
ity requirements of VSNs, hence allowing for other applica-
tions to coexist on-board each sensor. In addition, we have
provided simple metrics for measuring perceptual similar-
ity, robustness, security, and the optimality of share sizes. We
have provided a comprehensive simulation and discussion of
the results encompassing significant aspects of the problem.
Future work will look at combining the proposed algorithm
within an image/video compression algorithm compatible
with VSNs as well as developing general design insights for
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Figure 11: (a) Similarity rate; (b) dissimilarity rate.
the generation of secure shares in deterministic and random
cases.
APPENDIX
A. ADDITIONAL SIMULATION RESULTS
Although the perceptual constants ρ0 and ρ1 were gener-
ated empirically for the bus image, we show in this section
that highly similar results are achieved for a different image
of similar dimensions using these constants. This demon-
strates that we can choose N and t ahead of time if the image
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 12: (a) Sample share; (b) decryption using t = 10 shares; (c) decryption using 40 shares.
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Figure 13: (a) ‖x0 +
∑n
k=0 uk − x‖ as a function of the number of shares n; (b) Pr{
∑n
k=0 |uk| ≤ |x − x0|} as a function of the number of
shares n.
dimensions are approximately as those used in the simula-
tions presented here in Figures 11, 12, and 13.
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